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The Deªnition of “Gender” in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Step Forward or Back for 
International Criminal Justice? 
 
Valerie Oosterveld* 
In 1998, the term “gender” was used and deªned for the ªrst time in an 
international criminal law treaty, the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court (“ICC”).1 Will the deªnition help or hinder the ICC in its work? 
More generally, does the deªnition advance, or narrow, the way international 
law understands “gender”? The use of the term “gender” in the Rome Stat-
ute is generally viewed as positive for international criminal law, as it mir-
rors the increasingly common use of the term in international human rights 
law over the past decade. However, opinions vary widely about the deªni-
tion of “gender” adopted in the Rome Statute, and include some sharp criti-
cism. Some describe it as “stunningly narrow,”2 a “failure,”3 “puzzling and 
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1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The deªnition is found in article 7(3). 
2. Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects and International Law, 15 Can. J.L. & Juris. 
281, 283 (2002). Stephanie Farrior has similarly described the deªnition as “limiting.” Stephanie Farrior, 
The Rights of Women in International Human Rights Law Textbooks: Segregation, Integration, or Omission?, 12 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 587, 589 (2003). 
3. Brook Sari Moshan, Women, War and Words: The Gender Component in the Permanent International 
Criminal Court’s Deªnition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. 154, 178 (1998). 
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bizarre,”4 “peculiar,”5 “restraining,”6 and having “limited transformative edge.”7 
Others claim that it wrongfully “elides the notions of ‘gender’ and ‘sex,’”8 
making “gender” mean the same as biological “sex” and therefore not recog-
nizing that “gender is a constructed and contingent set of assumptions about 
female and male roles.”9 One United Nations Special Rapporteur describes 
the deªnition as “prevent[ing] approaches that rely on the social construc-
tion of gender.”10 Some commentators view the deªnition more positively, 
characterizing it as “consistent with other, more clearly stated formulations” 
adopted within the United Nations.11 
The strongly negative reactions are not surprising. Article 7(3) of the 
Rome Statute provides the following deªnition of “gender”: “For the pur-
poses of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two 
sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does 
not indicate any meaning different from the above.”12 This oddly worded 
and circular provision emerged from difªcult and highly contentious nego-
tiations in which the term “gender” served as a lightning rod for conservative 
concerns about sexuality, unlike other terms such as “political,” “racial,” “na-
 
                                                                                                                      
4. Dorean M. Koenig & Kelly D. Askin, International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court 
Statute: Crimes Against Women, in 2 Women and International Human Rights Law 3, 20 n.73 
(Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000). Askin notes that, at a roundtable discussion, Professor 
Theo van Boven described the deªnition as “the most puzzling and bizarre language ever included in an 
international treaty.” 
5. Id. at 20; see also Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into 
International Criminal Law, 46 McGill L.J. 217, 236 (2000) (describing the deªnition as “peculiar and 
circular,” albeit from a more positive point of view). 
6. Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, 340 (2002). 
7. Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis 335 (2000). 
8. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 379, 394 (1999) 
[hereinafter Charlesworth, Feminist Methods]. See also Ruth B. Philips, Too Close to Home?: International 
Criminal Law, War Crimes and Family Violence, 24 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 229, 233 n.14 (2002). 
9. Charlesworth, Feminist Methods, supra note 8, at 394. 
10. Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes, and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/45, Violence Against Women Perpe-
trated and/or Condoned by the State During Times of Armed Conºict (1997–2000), U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on 
Hum. Rts., 57th Sess., Agenda Item 12(a), ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (2001) [hereinafter Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women]. 
11. Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed 
Conºict, Update to the Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, U.N ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda 
Item 6, ¶ 26, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/sub.2/2000/21(2000) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery]. See also Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall Martinez, Ending Impunity for 
Gender Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 Brown J. World Aff. 65 (1999), available at 
http://www.crlp.org/pub_art_icc.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005); Barbara Bedont, Gender-Speciªc Provi-
sions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 1 Essays on the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court 183, 187 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
Bedont, Gender-Speciªc Provisions]; Copelon, supra note 5, at 237; Machteld Boot, III. Paragraph 3: 
Deªnition of Gender, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 171, 172 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
12. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3). 
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tional,” “ethnic,” “cultural,” “religious,” “age,” “wealth,” and “birth” included 
in the broad lists of prohibited grounds of persecution and discrimination.13 
The deªnition sharply reºected the use of “constructive ambiguity” by the 
negotiators.14 The critics are concerned because the word “gender” occurs 
nine times in the Rome Statute, in key articles on crimes against human-
ity,15 applicable law,16 the ofªce of the Prosecutor,17 the duties and powers of 
the Prosecutor with respect to investigations,18 and the protection of victims 
and witnesses as well as their participation in proceedings.19 How the ICC 
interprets “gender” will have a direct impact on the kinds of cases of perse-
cution that the Court may be able to prosecute, as well as on the law applied, on 
how the Prosecutor undertakes his/her duties, and on the protection and par-
ticipation of victims and witnesses. It could also profoundly affect the legal 
construction of “gender” under international law. 
This Article begins with an examination of the negotiation process that 
led to the adoption of the deªnition of “gender” in the Rome Statute, in 
which the author took an active part. Part II then surveys deªnitions of 
“gender” used by the United Nations in the areas of international human 
rights and refugee law. Part III examines four concerns raised by commenta-
tors regarding the Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender.” The ªrst concern is 
that the direct linkage in the deªnition of the term “gender” with the term 
“sex” seems to conºate the two. Some commentators fear that the ICC deªni-
tion equates “gender” with biologically determined “sex,” thereby eliminat-
ing the understanding that “gender” is a social construct. The second concern is 
that the phrase “within the context of society” diverges from references to 
socially constructed roles found in United Nations documents. The U.N. 
deªnitions are more detailed and tend to interpret social construction 
broadly to include an examination of attitudes, values, responsibilities, op-
portunities, and relationships between and among women and men, while 
acknowledging the inºuence of culture, political and economic context, class, 
race, ethnicity, poverty level, sexual orientation, and age. The ICC’s stark 
reference to “context of society” therefore raises the question whether the 
ICC has a much more limited understanding of social construction. The 
third concern is that the negotiating history and the statement “the term 
‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above” could be 
interpreted to exclude sexual orientation from falling within the deªnition 
of “gender.” Such a construction would thereby eliminate persecution con-
ducted on the basis of sexual orientation as a crime against humanity, per-
 
                                                                                                                      
13. Id. arts. 7(1)(h), 21(3). 
14. “Constructive ambiguity” is a term used in diplomacy to refer to the use of ambiguous words that 
give comfort to those on different sides of a debate, thereby promoting agreement. 
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(h), 7(3). 
16. Id. art. 21(3). 
17. Id. art. 42(9). 
18. Id. art. 54(1)(b). 
19. Id. art. 68(1). 
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mitting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the ICC’s inter-
pretation and application of law, and excluding the ICC from considering 
sexual orientation when addressing the needs of victims and witnesses. The 
ªnal concern stems from the fact that “gender” is the only term deªned in 
the context of the crime against humanity of persecution. Some commenta-
tors thus fear that the singling out of “gender” for deªnition, and the lack of 
clarity in that deªnition, will leave the ICC in a weaker position to prose-
cute and convict gender-based persecution as compared to other forms of 
persecution. 
This Article concludes in Part IV by arguing that the critics are overly 
harsh. Admittedly, the drafters missed a key opportunity to adopt a clear 
and visionary approach to “gender” in the text of the Rome Statute. How-
ever, the critics have overlooked the fact that there were few better alterna-
tives likely to emerge from the negotiations. More importantly, they have 
not recognized that by resorting to the use of “constructive ambiguity,” the 
drafters did leave open opportunities for a positive and precedent-setting 
approach—an opportunity that should be seized upon by lawyers and the 
ICC itself. Those interpreting “gender” should be guided by key signals in 
the Rome Statute and international law indicating that “gender” is to be 
understood broadly as a multifaceted, complex, and socially constructed cate-
gory. In addition, those interpreting “gender” should refer to international 
legal theory on gender-sensitivity. Given that there has been relatively little 
focus to date on the content of the term “gender” in international legal the-
ory, increased theorization can also play a central role in ensuring productive 
and sensitive interpretations of the term by the ICC. With interpretive assis-
tance from the Rome Statute, United Nations practice, international law, 
and international legal theory, the deªnition of “gender” included in the 
Rome Statute will help rather than hinder the ICC in its work, and conse-
quently will assist in advancing the understanding of “gender” in interna-
tional law. 
I. Including “Gender” in the Rome Statute: 
The Negotiation History 
Unlike the ªnal version of the 1998 Rome Statute, which refers to “gen-
der” nine times, the 1994 draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 
by the International Law Commission (“ILC”) did not contain the word 
“gender.”20 The ªnal text was the result of a strong lobbying effort by non-
governmental organizations21 and of recognition among many delegations 
that the Statute needed to be gender-sensitive if the ICC was to comprehen-
 
                                                                                                                      
20. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 20, at 70–73, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994). See also Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, arts. 7(1)(b), 7(3), 21, 42(9), 54(1)(b), 68(1). 
21. Especially the coalition of nongovernmental organizations known as the Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice. 
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sively address genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Use of the 
term “gender” was ªrst proposed in 1996 when several states recommended 
adding a reference to gender balance to the ILC’s article on the qualiªcations 
and election of judges.22 In February 1997, the term “gender” was included 
in brackets23 in the crime against humanity of persecution as a speciªcally 
prohibited ground of persecution,24 echoing recent advances in international 
refugee law.25 Five more references to “gender” were added to the draft ICC 
Statute in the August 1997 Preparatory Committee negotiations. Two of 
these references were included in a provision calling on the Prosecutor to 
take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecu-
tion of crimes, while also respecting, inter alia, the gender of victims and 
witnesses and taking into account whether the crime involved sexual or gender 
violence.26 Similar references were added into a provision stating that the 
Prosecutor must take appropriate measures to protect victims and witnesses, 
“having regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and 
the nature of the crime, in particular whether the crime involves sexual or 
gender violence.”27 Another provision stated that the “Court shall take such 
measures as are necessary to ensure the safety, physical and psychological well-
 
                                                                                                                      
22. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Vol. II 
(Compilation of Proposals), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 11, 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996). 
See also Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I (Pro-
ceedings of the Preparatory Committee During March-April and August 1996), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 
No. 22, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996). 
23. In international negotiations, the use of square brackets indicates text that has not been accepted 
by consensus. 
24. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held from 11 to 21 February 1997, U.N. 
GAOR, Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, 51st mtg., Annex 1, at 4, 5 
n.7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (1997). “Gender” was bracketed as part of the debate on whether to 
include an illustrative (open-ended) list of prohibited grounds for persecution, or an exhaustive (closed) 
list. Some countries supported a short illustrative list without “gender” because additional grounds could 
be “read in” by the ICC’s judges on a case-by-case basis. Certain other countries argued for an exhaustive 
list taken from the Charters and Statutes of previous international criminal tribunals (which did not 
include “gender”). See Darryl Robinson, Deªning “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 43, 53–54 (1999); e-mail from Darryl Robinson, Legal Ofªcer, Foreign Affairs Canada, to 
Valerie Oosterveld, Legal Ofªcer, Foreign Affairs Canada (Feb. 18, 2004) (on ªle with author). 
25. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees EXCOM had issued Conclusion No. 39 
(XXXVI), which recognized that states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpre-
tation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed 
the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a “particular social group” within 
the meaning of article 1(a)(2) of the Refugee Convention. Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) on Refugee Women 
and International Protection, Executive Comm. of the United Nations High Comm’n for Refugees, ¶¶ (b), 
(k), U.N. Doc. HRC/IP/2 (1985). In addition, the UNHCR had issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refu-
gee Women, Ofªce of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (1991) and U.N. High 
Comm’n for Refugees, Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and 
Response (1995). Several countries had also recognized, through policy or legislation, that gender-based 
persecution is a valid ground for claiming refugee status. See Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and 
Refugee Status 3 (2000). 
26. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held from 4 to 15 August 1997, U.N. 
GAOR, Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Annex 2, at 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1 (1997). 
27. Id. art. 43(2). 
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being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses, at all stages of the proc-
ess, including, but not limited to, victims and witnesses of sexual and gender 
violence.”28 This last provision gained wide acceptance and was not bracketed, 
while the previous provisions were bracketed because delegates debated whether 
the text should make separate mention of the Prosecutor’s role in protecting 
victims and witnesses.29 
At the December 1997 negotiations, a proposal was made to include a provi-
sion stating that the ICC’s application and interpretation of general sources 
of law must be consistent with, among other things, norms of nondiscrimi-
nation based on gender.30 Support for this idea grew, and the March 1998 
draft incorporated the idea in an unbracketed article.31 During the March 
1998 negotiations, the Preparatory Committee also adopted a provision, ulti-
mately bracketed, compelling the Prosecutor to appoint advisers with legal 
expertise on sexual and gender violence.32 The issue of the qualiªcations of 
judges originally raised in 1996 was revisited,33 and draft text was included 
in brackets stating that those selecting the ICC’s judges should consider in 
their selection gender balance and the need for “expertise on issues related to 
sexual and gender violence, violence against children and other similar mat-
ters.”34 The delegates also agreed that the staff of the Court should be se-
lected with regard to similar criteria.35 
Going into the Rome Diplomatic Conference, there appeared to be partial 
agreement on the use of the term “gender” in the Statute, with two provisions 
containing the term accepted by consensus and a number of others bracketed 
and therefore open to debate.36 Negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference 
 
                                                                                                                      
28. Id. art. 43(3). 
29. At this time, no state questioned (at least publicly) the use of the term “gender” in these provi-
sions. 
30. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held 1 to 12 December 1997, U.N. GAOR, 
Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Annex 2, at 14 n.11, U.N. 
Doc.A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997). 
31. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Draft Stat-
ute and Draft Final Act), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
Int’l Crim. Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–17, 1998, at art. 20(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998) 
[hereinafter 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee]. However, certain conservative states 
asked, in corridor discussions, why this article did not refer to non-discrimination on the basis of sex. 
32. Id. art. 43(9). 
33. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Vol. II 
(Compilation of Proposals), supra note 22. 
34. 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 31, art. 43(9). For a description of 
opposition to these references, see Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in The International Criminal Court: 
The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations, Results 357, 377–80 (Roy S. Lee ed., 
1999). 
35. 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 31, art. 45(2). This was done 
through a cross reference to article 37(8). 
36. Id. The provisions accepted by consensus were articles 20(3) on applicable law and 68(3) on meas-
ures the Court shall take with respect to victims. The bracketed provisions were the Crimes Against 
Humanity article, article 37(8)(e) on gender balance among judges and judicial qualiªcations, article 
43(9) on a Prosecutor-appointed gender adviser, article 54(4)(e) on Prosecutorial investigations, and 
article 68(2) on measures the Prosecutor shall take with respect to victims. 
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began smoothly, with the adoption of a provision stating that the “Prosecutor 
shall appoint advisers with legal expertise on speciªc issues, including, but 
not limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against children.”37 
However, opposition to the use of “gender” soon arose in the negotiations 
relating to the qualiªcations of judges.38 At the same time as countries ques-
tioned the references to “gender” in the provision on judicial qualiª-cations,39 
conservative nongovernmental organizations distributed lobby papers calling 
for the deletion of both “gender balance” and the reference to judicial exper-
tise in sexual and gender violence.40 
After a long negotiation process, delegates ultimately chose to resolve the 
impasse by removing the term “gender” from the judicial provisions. While 
 
                                                                                                                      
37. Agreement was reached in the informal negotiations of the Working Group on Composition and 
Administration of the Court on June 29, 1998. Valerie Oosterveld, Member of the Canadian Delegation 
to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, Notes From Informals of the Working Group on Composition and Administration of 
the Court, June 29, 1998 (on ªle with author). The provision was adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole and sent to the Drafting Committee on July 4, 1998. Recommendations of the Coordinator: Part 4, 
Composition and Administration of the Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.45 
(1998). 
38. In initial public discussions of the issue, the delegate from Syria stated that the paragraph provid-
ing for judges with expertise “on issues related to sexual and gender violence” was unacceptable: “he 
knew of no specialty called ‘gender violence.’” Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 14th 
mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.14 (1998) [hereinafter Comm. of the 
Whole, Summary Record of the 14th Meeting]. Iran argued that reference to “gender balance” could give rise 
to difªculties of understanding and interpretation, and that the reference to judicial expertise in sexual 
and gender violence might be expanded, for example to include expertise in the crime of torture. Sum-
mary Record of the 15th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 15th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/ 
C.1/SR.15 (1998) [hereinafter Comm. of the Whole, Summary Record of the 15th Meeting]. Some states 
opposed to the use of “gender” expressed concern in corridor discussions that their judges would not be 
considered to have expertise in gender-based violence because such violence was traditionally dealt with 
outside of the criminal justice system. Countries from all regions also spoke publicly in favor of retaining 
the references to “gender balance” or judicial expertise in sexual and gender violence. See Comm. of the 
Whole, Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, supra (for comments from the United States, Nigeria, Colom-
bia, New Zealand, Sweden, Afghanistan, Senegal); Comm. of the Whole, Summary Record of the 15th 
Meeting, supra (for comments from Oman, Canada, Australia, Thailand, Libya, Brunei Darussalam, Iraq, 
Burundi, Ghana, Costa Rica, and Finland). 
39. See Steains, supra note 34, at 381 n.80 for a list of countries that spoke in favor. For those that 
called for deletion, see id. at 381 n.81. 
40. For example, a paper prepared by the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies stated: 
some groups espouse the vague concept of “gender sensitivity” as a litmus test in the judicial 
selection process. While consideration of the needs of women and children in the judicial selec-
tion process is appropriate, use of the undeªned (and readily expansive) concept of “gender sen-
sitivity” is problematic, and could be used by some special interest groups to undermine tradi-
tional moral, cultural and religious values. 
David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Impartiality in the Election of Judges, at http://www. 
worldfamilypolicycenter.org/wfpc/About_the_WFPC/papers/icc_report.html#AppH1 (last visited Jan. 
12, 2005). In an untitled paper, REAL Women of Canada argued that the word “gender” is used by 
special interest groups to capture the idea that men and women’s roles are socially constructed, and that 
the term can be used to establish or advance “rights” based on sexual conduct or sexual orientation: “On 
n’a jamais déªni le mot ‘gender’ précisément [The word ‘gender’ was never precisely deªned].” (on ªle 
with author). 
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many countries wished to retain the reference to “gender” in “gender bal-
ance” because it followed the precedent set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action,41 the delegates agreed to change the reference to 
“female and male.”42 Negotiations on whether some judges should have ex-
pertise on issues relating to sexual and gender violence led to a similar result, 
with the ªnal text simply referring to expertise “on speciªc issues, includ-
ing, but not limited to, violence against women or children.”43 Those who 
had supported the retention of the reference to “gender” were comforted by 
the fact that the list describing expertise is illustrative rather than exhaus-
tive and that expertise on violence against women or children overlaps to 
some extent (though not entirely) with expertise on gender issues. 
While two references to “gender” were removed to resolve the disagree-
ment on judicial qualiªcations, many states felt strongly that this was not a 
viable solution for other references to “gender” in the Statute. Supporters felt 
that the remaining references to “gender” had to be retained. Debate about 
whether to remove the term from the provision on persecution was set aside 
for later discussion,44 and the focus shifted to the applicable law provision, 
the forum in which the issue was resolved.45 This provision sets out the law 
to be applied by the Court and concludes with a “no adverse distinction” 
clause, the draft of which initially read: “The application and interpretation 
of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally rec-
ognized human rights, which include the prohibition of adverse distinction 
founded on gender” and other grounds.46 While the text of this paragraph 
was agreed upon at the March 1998 Preparatory Committee negotiations, 
 
                                                                                                                      
41. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1 Report of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/REV.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 
(1996) [hereinafter Beijing Platform for Action]. 
42. In fact, since the meaning here related to biological sex, it made sense to change it for termino-
logical clarity, despite the Beijing Platform for Action’s language of gender balance. Charlesworth makes 
“a plea for greater terminological awareness,” so “gender” is not used where “sex” is the appropriate term, 
and vice-versa. See Hilary Charlesworth, The Gender of International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety-Third 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 93 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 206 (1999) [here-
inafter Charlesworth, Proceedings]. 
43. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(8). 
44. This was done by ºagging the term with a footnote stating that “gender” “refers to male or fe-
male.” Article 5, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiar-
ies on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–17, 1998, at 2 n.2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.44 (1998). This was not an agreed-upon deªnition; it was simply a placeholder for 
later debate. Dissenting states were concerned that their male nationals could be charged with crimes 
against humanity because of traditional gender-based practices and criminalization of homosexuality. For 
example, Azerbaijan asked if the persecution provision could “imply that a conviction by a national court 
for homosexual acts might be regarded as persecution and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the Court as 
a crime against humanity?” Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 25th mtg., Agenda Item 
11, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 (2002). 
45. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3), formerly 20(3), during the negotiations. While the 
deªnition of “gender” was debated in this forum, debates on retaining or deleting the term still took 
place in negotiations on other articles. See Steains, supra note 34, at 386–89. 
46. 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 31, art. 20(3). 
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several countries now argued that the term “gender” should be deleted from 
the list of enumerated grounds or that the clause should end at “internation-
ally recognized human rights.”47 This led to a polarized debate, with many 
countries expressing their support for, or opposition to, retaining the term 
“gender.”48 The opposition argued that the term “gender” could imply rights 
more expansive than those currently recognized in many states, with the 
main concern being that the term might sanction rights based on sexual orien-
tation.49 Some also argued that “gender” could not be adequately translated 
into all six ofªcial U.N. languages.50 Conservative nongovernmental organi-
zations distributed lobby papers making similar (but more detailed) argu-
ments.51 
After it became clear that the debate had come to an impasse on the term 
“gender,” the Chair of the Working Group on Applicable Law asked if the 
solution used at the 1995 World Conference on Women could resolve the 
difference of opinion. In that case, the President of the World Conference 
had made a statement on the commonly understood meaning of the term “gen-
der” and an annex containing this statement was included in the conference 
report.52 Many delegations felt this was an acceptable solution, but those op-
 
                                                                                                                      
47. Steains, supra note 34, at 372. 
48. For example, on July 11 and 13, 1998, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa, 
Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, and the United States argued in favor of retaining the term “gender,” 
while Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Guatemala, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen called for the elimination of the term “gender.” 
Valerie Oosterveld, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Notes From Working Group 
on Applicable Law, July 11, 13, 1998 (on ªle with author). 
49. Steains, supra note 34, at 372. The concern that the term might also recognize women’s human 
rights not recognized domestically was also implicit in some statements. 
50. This argument, which is commonly made at the United Nations with respect to the term “gen-
der,” was also made in Rome. Oosterveld, supra note 48. 
51. For example, a position paper prepared by the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies 
raises several concerns: 
If “gender,” as used in the ICC Draft Statute, in fact means something beyond “male” and “fe-
male,” the ICC will drastically restructure societies throughout the world. The possibilities in-
clude everything from hiring quotas to sexual orientation to abortion—hardly an appropriate 
agenda for a “criminal” court. The ICC was never intended, nor should it be used, to redeªne 
and regulate all ‘socially constructed roles’ that exist throughout the globe. Remember: in the 
Arabic and French texts, the word gender is never used; instead the Arabic and French texts re-
fer to “the two sexes.” 
David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, What’s the Argument for “Gender Justice?” (unpub-
lished position paper, undated) (on ªle with author). 
52. Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995, 
Addendum, Annex IV, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1996) [hereinafter 
Beijing Conference Addendum]. This statement notes that a contact group was formed to examine the 
meaning of the word “gender” and concluded “(1) the word ‘gender’ had been commonly used and under-
stood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage in numerous other United Nations forums and confer-
ences; (2) there was no indication that any new meaning or connotation of the term, different from ac-
cepted prior usage, was intended in the Platform for Action” and reafªrmed “that the word ‘gender’ as 
used in the Platform for Action was intended to be interpreted and understood as it was in ordinary, 
generally accepted usage.” Id. 
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posed to the use of the term argued that the Beijing solution was too vague 
as it did not actually deªne “gender,” and such a “non-deªnition” would violate 
the requirement of certainty in criminal law.53 In bilateral and corridor dis-
cussions, those opposed insisted that adoption of a suitable deªnition was 
the only way in which the term could remain. 
Negotiations then shifted to drafting a deªnition that could be accepted 
by all countries, and a series of proposals were considered informally.54 Coun-
tries opposed to the use of the term “gender” indicated that they would only 
consider a deªnition that referred to “men, women and children” or “the two 
sexes, male and female.”55 Countries supporting use of the term were com-
mitted to ensuring that any deªnition adopted would reºect that “gender” 
refers to socially constructed understandings of what it means to be male or 
female. Positive (what “gender” means) and negative (what “gender” does 
not mean) approaches were considered by both sides, and the positive ap-
proach was deemed to be more acceptable. In accordance with the nature of 
the negotiations,56 those supportive of retaining the term made proposals 
referring to both “male and female” and socially constructed roles, such as: 
“men and women and their roles in society,” “being a male or female and its 
[associated] implications in society,” “men and women and their functions in 
society,” “males and females within society,” and “males and females in the 
context of society.”57 Those opposed to the term insisted on reference to “two 
sexes” and agreed on the inclusion of a reference to “society,” proposing: “For 
the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to 
the two sexes, male and female, [and their roles] within society [in the con-
text of society]. The term does not imply the existence of more than two 
sexes.”58 Those supportive of retaining “gender” countered that the ªnal 
 
                                                                                                                      
53. Oosterveld, supra note 48. Several delegates referred to the Beijing solution as a “non-deªnition.” Id. 
54. On July 13, 1998, the Chair of the Working Group asked Canada and Chile to try to ªnd a solu-
tion with a small group of opposing countries. This led to a series of informal meetings—among suppor-
tive states, among opposing states, and between the two groups, in corridors and on the side of other 
negotiations—outside the context of the Working Group. These are referred to in diplomatic parlance as 
“informal informals.” Id. 
55. Id.; see also Valerie Oosterveld, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Notes From 
Informal Informal Discussions, July 13–14, 1998 (on ªle with author) [hereinafter Author’s Notes From 
Informal Informal Discussions]; Summary Record of the 28th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 28th mtg., Agenda 
Item 11, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28 (1998) (statement of Kuwait to the Committee of the 
Whole on July 28, 1998). 
56. The ICC negotiations followed United Nations practice and worked by consensus. In consensus 
negotiations, those who oppose something are usually in the better position to make gains toward their 
position (by remaining intransigent), and those who support retention of something are forced to make 
proposals and concessions in order to keep at least some of their ideas in the document, even if they repre-
sent the majority of views. As a result, the negotiation process creates strong pressures favoring “con-
structive ambiguity” over complexity, and the inherent complexity of the deªnition of “gender” was 
reduced to two ideas: who was covered, and in what context? See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
57. Author’s Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55; Steains, supra note 34, at 374 
n.52. 
58. Author’s Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55. As an explanation of why they 
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sentence should at least reºect the Beijing approach and read: “The term does 
not imply any new meaning or connotation of the term different from ac-
cepted prior usage.”59 
In the ªnal round of informal negotiations, references to “in the context of 
their society” or “in the context of society and the traditional family unit” 
were proposed by those opposed to “gender” but rejected as too restrictive by 
those supportive of the term, while “in the context of society” was accepted 
by both sides as having “sufªcient ºexibility as well as precision.”60 Those 
opposed to “gender” then insisted that they required something further, and 
the result was that the ªnal sentence used words that had been proposed before, 
but written tautologically: “The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any mean-
ing different from the above.” While an unusual solution, this sentence gave 
comfort to those opposed to “gender” because they saw it as reafªrming the 
“two sexes, male and female,” while those supportive felt that it was harm-
less because it reafªrmed the valuable sociological reference to “context of 
society.” After further debate about how to incorporate the deªnition into 
the Rome Statute, the delegates added the words “as deªned in article 7(3)” 
after each reference to “gender” found in the Statute. 
While many were surprised at the contentiousness of the debate on “gen-
der” at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, there was precedent for this level 
of disagreement. The Holy See, certain Arab states, and conservative organi-
zations had earlier made their strong views on the term “gender” known in 
other international fora, for example in the negotiations on the 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action. Following the adoption of that docu-
ment, the Holy See stated that it understood the term “gender” “as grounded in 
biological sexual identity, male or female” and thus excluding “dubious in-
terpretations based on world views which assert that sexual identity can be 
adapted indeªnitely to suit new and different purposes.”61 Certain conserva-
 
                                                                                                                      
insisted on the reference to “two” sexes, some state representatives indicated that they feared that there 
might be ªve or more genders. This refers to the “ªve genders” theory of the Christian Right, who be-
lieve that the goal of certain feminist activists is to give members of the human family ªve genders from 
which to choose (male, female, homosexual, lesbian, or transgendered) instead of two (male or female). 
Doris E. Buss, Finding the Homosexual in Women’s Rights: The Christian Right in International Politics, 6 
Int’l Feminist J. Pol. 257, 569 (2004). This also refers to the “herm” (hermaphrodites), “ferm” (female 
hermaphrodites), and “merm” (male pseudo hermaphrodites) argument used by conservative organiza-
tions in the Beijing Conference negotiations as a reason for “demanding assurance that only two sexes 
would be recognized.” Sally Baden & Anne Marie Goetz, Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]? 
Conºicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing, in Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis 
and Policy 19, 30 (Cecile Jackson & Ruth Pearson eds., 1998). These arguments were made in corridor 
discussions and in “informal informal” negotiations. 
59. Author’s Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55; Steains, supra note 34, at 374 
n.53. 
60. Steains, supra note 34, at 374. 
61. Beijing Conference Addendum, supra note 52, at 164. The term “dubious interpretation” refers to 
the Holy See’s opposition to sexuality that is not innate. Doris E. Buss, The Vatican and the Beijing 
Conference on Women, 7 Soc. & Legal Studies 339, 348–49 (1998). The Holy See’s position was most 
recently articulated in the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in 
the Church and in the World (Holy See, Vatican), July 31, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
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tive Catholic and Arab states and nongovernmental organizations also ex-
pressed similar positions during the Beijing negotiations62 and again in 1996 at 
the Habitat World Conference.63 
II. United Nations Approach to Deªning “Gender” 
There are two approaches within the United Nations to deªning “gender.” 
The ªrst is a minimalist approach taken at the multilateral (state-negotiated) 
level. Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute deªnition, states basically 
left the term undeªned, either overtly or implicitly. “Gender” has been re-
ferred to without deªnition for over a decade in United Nations multilateral 
human rights documents, such as the outcome documents of some U.N. 
World Conferences64 and numerous resolutions from the Commission on 
Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, and General Assembly.65 As 
described above, the term “gender” was included in the 1995 Beijing Decla-
ration and Platform for Action only after states agreed that the President of 
 
                                                                                                                      
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html. 
62. Diane Otto, Lesbians? Not in My Country: Sexual Orientation and the Beijing World Conference on 
Women, 20 Alternative L.J. 288, 89–290 (1995); Buss, supra note 61, at 354. Conservative NGOs 
characterized “gender” as a “profoundly elastic term, encapsulating a broad feminist rights strategy that 
includes abortion.” Doris Buss & Didi Herman, Globalizing Family Values: the Christian 
Right in International Politics 113 (2003) (citing Austin Ruse, Feminists at U.N.: Seek Redeªnition 
of Universal Human Rights, NewsMax.com, Nov. 13, 1998, at http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a= 
1998/11/13/63434). Buss and Herman point out that these groups fear that the term “gender” challenges 
an essential “woman-ness” or “man-ness,” which leads to the erasure of “the two” sexes, with homosexual-
ity as the inevitable outcome. Id. at 64. 
63. This resulted in a footnote stating: “The statement on the commonly understood meaning of the 
term ‘gender,’ presented at the Fourth World Conference on Women by the President of the Conference, 
is reproduced in Annex V to the present report.” Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settle-
ments, U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, Istanbul, Turkey, June 3–14, 1996, Annex I, ¶ 46, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.165/14 (Aug. 7, 1996), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/unchs/english/hagenda/ch-
3d.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Istanbul Declaration]. 
64. For example, note the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human 
Rights, June 14–25, 1993, ¶¶ 18, 38, 42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993). Another example is the 
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for 
Social Development, in Report of the World Summit for Social Development, World Summit for Social Devel-
opment, Copenhagen, Denmark, Mar. 6–12, 1995, Commitments 5, 6, 8, ¶¶ 7, 16, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 36, 45, 47, 53, 56, 70, 73, 74, 77, 83, 91, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995). One exception to this 
trend was the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, in Report of the World Conference 
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, World Conference Against Ra-
cism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, S. Afr., Aug. 31–Sept. 8, 
2001, at 5, 75, n.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2002) [hereinafter Durban Declaration and Programme 
of Action], in which the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender” was included. 
65. For examples of such statements from the General Assembly, see Comprehensive Implementation of 
and Follow-Up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 
54th Sess., 58th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/78 (1998); Elimination of Domestic Violence Against 
Women, G.A. Res. 58/147, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 110, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/147 (2004); 
Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, G.A. Res. 48/108, 
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/108 (1994); Rights of the Child, U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., 60th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/80 (1999); 
Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations, U.N. ESCOR, 
Substantive Sess. of 2004, Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/2004/L.35 (2004); Women in Development, G.A. 
Res. 52/195, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/195 (1998). 
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the Conference would make a statement indicating that the word “gender” 
as used in the Platform for Action was intended to be interpreted and under-
stood “in [its] ordinary, generally accepted usage” and that “there was no indica-
tion that any new meaning or connotation of the term, different from accepted 
prior usage, was intended in the Platform for Action.”66 This same approach 
was adopted the next year in the 1996 Habitat World Conference.67 
The second approach to deªning “gender,” followed by the United Nations 
and its agencies, is quite different. These institutions have adopted a number 
of deªnitions of “gender,” some relatively detailed. While the deªnitions used 
and promoted within various parts of the U.N. differ in focus and wording, 
they all tend to emphasize three similar points: ªrst, “gender” is a socially 
constructed concept; second, the construction of “gender” is complex and is 
inºuenced by culture, the roles women and men are expected to play, the 
relationships among those roles, and the value society places on those roles; 
and third, the content of “gender” can vary within and among cultures, and 
over time. 
All U.N. deªnitions emphasize the fact that “gender” is a social construct, 
and therefore is a learned rather than innate category. Different deªnitions 
approach social construction in different ways. Certain U.N. deªnitions deªne 
“gender” by contrasting it with “sex.” Of the two main U.N. deªnitions 
that were in use at the time of the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, both 
took this approach. One, proposed in 1995, states: “The term ‘gender’ refers 
to the ways in which roles, attitudes, values and relationships regarding 
women and men are constructed by all societies all over the world. There-
fore, while the sex of a person is determined by nature, the gender of that 
person is socially constructed.”68 The second, included in the 1996 Report of 
the Secretary-General on “Integrating the Human Rights of Women Through-
out the United Nations System,” stated: “As sex refers to biologically de-
termined differences between men and women that are universal, so gender 
refers to the social differences between men and women that are learned, 
changeable over time and have wide variations both within and between 
cultures.”69 In 2002, the High Commissioner for Refugees issued inºuential 
guidelines on international protection for gender-related persecution.70 These 
 
                                                                                                                      
66. Beijing Conference Addendum, supra note 52, Annex IV. 
67. Istanbul Declaration, supra note 63, ¶ 46. 
68. Report of the Expert Group Meeting on the Development of Guidelines for the Integration of Gender Perspec-
tives into United Nations Human Rights Activities and Programmes, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 
52d Sess., Agenda Items 9, 21, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/105 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Report of the 
Expert Group Meeting]. 
69. Integrating the Human Rights of Women Throughout the United Nations System: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/40 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Report of 
the Secretary-General]. Similarly, a study submitted by the Secretary-General in 2002 deªned “gender” as 
referring to “the socially constructed roles as ascribed to women and men, as opposed to biological and 
physical characteristics.” Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security, U.N. SCOR, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. S/2002/1154 (2002). 
70. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. High Comm’r for Refu-
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guidelines distinguish between “gender” and “sex,” deªning the former as 
referring to “the relationship between women and men based on socially or cul-
turally constructed and deªned identities, status, roles and responsibilities 
that are assigned to one sex or another, while sex is a biological determina-
tion. Gender is not static or innate but acquires socially and culturally con-
structed meaning over time.”71 Similarly, the Commission on Human Rights’ 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has referred to “gender” as 
“the socially constructed roles of women and men ascribed to them on the 
basis of their sex.”72 
Other U.N. deªnitions do not emphasize that “gender” is a social con-
struct by contrasting “gender” with “sex.” Rather, they indicate that “gen-
der” is built upon a biological foundation. For example, the World Bank 
states that “[w]omen and men are different biologically but all cultures in-
terpret and elaborate on these innate biological differences into a set of social 
expectations about what behaviours and activities are appropriate, and what 
rights, resources, and power they possess.”73 Some U.N. deªnitions do not 
refer either to “sex” or biology, but instead focus on the social construction 
of “gender.” For example, the deªnition adopted by the Ofªce of the Special 
Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (“OSAGI”), which is 
intended to assist the United Nations system in implementing gender main-
streaming throughout the U.N. system, states that “gender” “refers to the 
social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female 
and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as 
relations between women and those between men. These attributes, oppor-
tunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through 
socialization processes.”74 Deªnitions adopted by the World Health Organi-
zation (“WHO”),75 the U.N. Environment Programme,76 the U.N. Devel-
 
                                                                                                                      
gees, at 1, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines on International Protec-
tion] (“These Guidelines are meant to provide legal interpretive guidance for governments, legal practi-
tioners, decision-makers and the judiciary as well as UNHCR staff carrying out refugee status determina-
tion in the ªeld.”). 
71. Id. ¶ 3. 
72. Review of Reports, Studies and Other Documentation for the Preparatory Comm. and the World Conference, 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, Ge-
neva, Switzerland, July 30–Aug. 10, 2001, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.3/5 (2001) [hereinafter 
Review of Reports]. 
73. World Bank, Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Re-
sources and Voice, A World Bank Policy Research Report 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_0102080
5393496 (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
74. OSAGI, Gender Mainstreaming, Concepts and Deªnitions, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/ 
conceptsandeªnitions.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). This deªnition is also used by the U.N. Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“MONUC”). MONUC, at http://www.monuc.org/gender/ 
equality.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
75. See WHO, Gender and Reproductive Rights, Glossary, at http://www.who.int/reproductive-
health/gender/glossary.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
76. See U.N. Environment Programme, Project Formulation, Approval, Monitoring and Evaluation Man-
ual, at ch. 13.1, available at http://www.unep.org/Project_Manual/13.1.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
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opment Fund for Women together with the U.N. Inter-Agency Project on 
Human Trafªcking in the Mekong Sub-Region,77 the U.N. Development 
Programme (“UNDP”),78 the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) 
together with the South-East Asia and the Paciªc Multidisciplinary Team,79 
and a 2003 expert group meeting sponsored by the U.N. Division for the 
Advancement of Women, the Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, the 
ILO, and UNDP also take this approach.80 Thus, the U.N. approach does 
not follow any one feminist theory, with some U.N. deªnitions contrasting 
“gender” and “sex” or “gender” and biology, and other deªnitions approach-
ing “gender” as any social construction of male/female distinctions (in con-
trast to masculine/feminine distinctions).81 
Many of the U.N. deªnitions of “gender” acknowledge that the construc-
tion of the term is strongly inºuenced by culture, which affects the roles women 
and men are expected to play, the relationship among those roles, and the 
value society places on those roles. For example, one deªnition states that 
“[h]istorically, different cultures construct gender in different ways so that 
women’s roles, the value that their society places on those roles, and the rela-
tionship with men’s roles may vary considerably over time and from one 
setting to another.”82 Another deªnition recognizes that the understanding 
of “gender” has “wide variations both within and between cultures.”83 Since 
culture and society are so closely intertwined in the construction of the term, 
the OSAGI deªnition notes that the concept of “gender” is part of “the 
broader socio-cultural context.”84 Other deªnitions similarly link society, 
culture, and sometimes political or economic context.85 Some deªnitions 
 
                                                                                                                      
77. See U.N. Development Fund for Women and the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human 
Trafªcking in the Mekong Sub-Region, Trafªcking in Persons: A Gender and Rights Perspective, Brieªng Kit, 
Sheet 4, at http://www.unifem-eseasia.org/resources/others/traffkit.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
78. See UNDP, Guide to Developing a UNDP Country Gender Brieªng Kit, at http://www.undp.org/ 
gender/docs/UNDP_Gender_Brieªng_Kit.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). The UNDP has also deªned 
“gender” as referring to the “comparative or differential roles, responsibilities and opportunities for 
women and men in a given society.” UNDP, Gender Mainstreaming Manual and Information Pack, at 
http://www.undp.org/gender/docs/GM_INFOPACK/GMGlossary1.doc (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
79. See ILO and South-East Asia and the Paciªc Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (“SEAPAT”), Online 
Gender Learning Information Module, Unit 1, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/mdtmanila/ 
training/homepage/mainmenu.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
80. U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, The Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender 
Equality, Report of the Expert Group Meeting, at 14, n.2, U.N. Doc. EGM/MEN-BOYS-GE/2003/REPORT 
(2004), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/men-boys2003/reports/Finalreport.pdf 
[hereinafter 2003 Expert Group Meeting]. 
81. Baden & Goetz, supra note 58, at 29 (citing Laura Nicholson, Interpreting Gender, 29 Signs 79 
(1994)). 
82. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13. This deªnition deªnes “gender” from 
the point of view of women, but most U.N. deªnitions deªne “gender” as it applies to both men and 
women (sometimes also explicitly mentioning girls and boys). “Gender” should always be deªned as 
applying to both women and men, in order not to conºate “gender” with “women” and therefore sub-
stantially narrow the deªnition of “gender.” 
83. 1996 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 69, ¶ 10. 
84. OSAGI, supra note 74. 
85. 2003 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 80, at 14 n.4 (referring to gender norms as “[s]ocial and cul-
tural expectations”); U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 76 (noting that “gender” roles “change 
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understand “gender” to be even more intersectional, and must be understood 
as interacting with class, race, ethnicity, poverty level, sexual orientation, 
and age.86 Inherent in these U.N. deªnitions is the understanding that those 
who fall outside the accepted construction of “gender” may suffer varying 
degrees of ostracism or other penalties in the societies in which they live. 
Another important feature of many U.N. deªnitions is the recognition that 
“gender” is a category that changes over time.87 Gender is not innate.88 While 
some deªnitions note that at any given moment in time, gender norms are 
often thought to be unchanging and representing tradition or natural differ-
ence between women and men,89 the World Bank deªnition states that gen-
der asymmetries “can at times change quite rapidly in response to policy and 
changing socioeconomic conditions.”90 
At the multilateral level,91 states have generally avoided deªning “gender.” 
This is because there is no consensus about the precise content of the term, 
and there are widely differing, strongly held views on what the term should 
and should not mean. Therefore, the term is usually left undeªned, either by 
not including any explanation or by stating that the term is to be interpreted or 
understood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage. Two deviations from this 
approach are the Rome Statute’s deªnition, and the replication of that deªnition 
in the outcome document of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism. 
 
                                                                                                                      
from one place and culture and across time”); Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10 (stating that “gender” 
depends on socio-economic, political, and cultural context); UNHCR Guidelines on International Protec-
tion, supra note 70, ¶ 3 (referring to “socially or culturally constructed and deªned identities, status, 
roles and responsibilities”); ILO and SEAPAT, supra note 79 (noting that social differences between men 
and women vary widely within and across cultures and treating “gender” as a “socio-economic variable 
for analysing roles, responsibilities, constraints, opportunities, and needs of men and women”); WHO, 
supra note 75 (referring to “economic, social and cultural attributes and opportunities associated with 
being male and female in a particular point in time”). 
86. Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10; OSAGI, supra note 74. The World Bank deªnition ap-
proaches the multi-dimensional nature of “gender” in a slightly different manner: “Like race, ethnicity 
and class, gender is a social category that largely establishes one’s life chances, shaping one’s participation 
in society and in the economy. Some societies do not experience racial or ethnic divides, but all societies 
experience gender asymmetries—differences and disparities—to varying degrees,” World Bank, supra 
note 73, at 24. 
87. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13; 1996 Report of the Secretary-General, 
supra note 69, ¶ 10; 2003 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 80, at 14, n.4; UNDP, supra note 78, at 17; 
U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 76; ILO and SEAPAT, supra note 79; OSAGI, supra note 74; 
WHO, supra note 75; World Bank, supra note 73, at 24. 
88. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 70, ¶ 3 (stating that “[g]ender is not 
static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning over time”). 
89. 2003 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 80, at 14 n.4. 
90. World Bank, supra note 73, at 24. 
91. The examples above have focused on the United Nations. Other multilateral institutions have also 
adopted deªnitions of “gender,” such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: 
“The term gender refers to the economic, social, political, and cultural attributes and opportunities associ-
ated with being male and female . . . . The nature of gender deªnitions (what it means to be male or 
female) and patterns of inequality vary among cultures and change over time.” Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Comm., DAC Guidelines 
for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation 12–13 
(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/46/28313843.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
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By contrast, the United Nations has taken the opposite approach of deªning 
“gender,” sometimes in substantial detail. While the deªnitions differ, they 
generally stress the socially constructed nature of “gender” (sometimes con-
trasting it with the biologically determined nature of “sex”), they note the 
complexity of this construction and the inºuence of culture, politics, eco-
nomics, race, and other variables, and they identify the time and context of 
“gender.” 
III. Criticism of the Rome Statute’s Deªnition of “Gender” 
The deªnition of “gender” included in the Rome Statute has garnered strong 
criticism. While the criticism varies, there appear to be four main grounds 
for concern relating to the perceived conºation of “gender” and “sex,” the 
limitations of the reference to “context of society,” the potential exclusion of 
sexual orientation from the deªnition of “gender,” and the sidelining of gen-
der issues through the inclusion of a deªnition. 
The Rome Statute’s deªnition begins with the statement: “For the purposes 
of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, 
male and female.” Hilary Charlesworth views this sentence as deliberately con-
fusing and as eliding “sex” and “gender.”92 She feels that the statement fails to 
communicate that gender is a socially constructed set of assumptions regard-
ing the roles of males and females.93 More pointedly, Charlesworth and Chris-
tine Chinkin argue that the phrase presents “gender” as an issue of biology 
rather than social construction, and thus the deªnition has limited transfor-
mative edge.94 The deªnition does not draw attention to aspects of social 
relations that are culturally contingent and without a foundation in biologi-
cal necessity, as use of the term “gender” should do.95 Brenda Cossman refers to 
the deªnition as a “stunningly narrow conception of gender.”96 She reads the 
deªnition as being explicitly limited to the two biological sexes and states 
that it is not even clear that the deªnition is intended to include the more 
typical understanding of gender as socially constructed roles and values.97 
Ruth Philips believes that the Rome Statute’s deªnition practically does not 
distinguish between gender and sex, leaving little room for cultural con-
struction of sex roles.98 
Does the reference to the “two sexes, male and female” collapse “gender” 
back into “sex”? The answer to this question is important because it will 
 
                                                                                                                      
92. Charlesworth, Feminist Methods, supra note 8, at 394; Charlesworth, Proceedings, supra note 42, at 
207. 
93. Charlesworth, Feminist Methods, supra note 8, at 394. 
94. Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 335. Charlesworth has also said that the result of 
such elision between “sex” and “gender” is a diminishing of the radical potential of both sexing and 
gendering international law. Charlesworth, Proceedings, supra note 42, at 207. 
95. Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 3. 
96. Cossman, supra note 2, at 283. 
97. Id. at 284. 
98. Philips, supra note 8, at 234 n.14. 
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determine what factors the ICC will consider in examining the crimes and 
the needs of victims and witnesses. For example, if “gender” is no more than 
“sex,” then the ICC would not be able to carry out the kind of analysis of 
men’s and women’s roles that proved to be critical in the disposition of the 
Krstic case in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via.99 Similarly, the ICC would simply consider whether a victim or witness 
was male or female, rather than also considering the social construction at-
tached to “male” or “female” in a given society, which could result in insensitive 
decisions about the protection or participation of the victim or witness. 
Those opposed to the deªnition of “gender” pressed hard for a deªnition that 
made “gender” mean the same thing as “sex,” because they feared that if it 
did not, the baseline for interpreting the social construction of “gender” 
would expand from male and female to either include ªve “genders” (adding 
gay, lesbian, and transgendered) and/or include hermaphrodites, female 
hermaphrodites, and male pseudo hermaphrodites.100 They were convinced 
that if “male and female,” the number “two,” and the word “sex” were used, 
biology would be the foremost factor in the deªnition. 
However, the references to “two sexes” and “male and female” cannot strip 
meaning from “gender” and render it equivalent to “sex,” because they are 
linked to the phrase “within the context of society.” A far more straightfor-
ward interpretation of the “two sexes, male and female” is that it serves as a 
signal to the ICC that the social construction of “gender” is to be interpreted 
from a biological male/female foundation, just as a number of United Na-
tions deªnitions of “gender” take “sex” as their starting point. A biological 
foundation is quite different from biological determinism, unless taken to an ex-
treme. 
The ICC should not take, and should not be assumed to take, a biologi-
cally determinist position in deªning “gender,” for two reasons. First, while 
the negotiating history does include a bloc that wished to ensure biological 
determinism, that history also includes a larger bloc that wished to ensure 
the opposite. The ICC will take that into account when considering the in-
tent of the drafters.101 Second, given that there is no consensus among com-
 
                                                                                                                      
99. In that case, the Tribunal examined the patriarchal nature of the Bosnian Muslim society in Sre-
brenica, and found that the Bosnian Serb forces were aware that destruction of a sizable number of men 
would “inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica” 
because these men would be ofªcially listed as missing and their spouses would be unable to remarry 
(having ªdelity to a missing husband) and consequently, would not have new children, Prosecutor v. 
Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, ¶ 93 nn.193 & 196, ¶ 595 (Aug. 2, 2001). “The 
physical destruction of the men therefore had severe procreative implications for the community.” Prose-
cutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 30 (Apr. 19, 2004). While Krstic was 
a case considering the crime of genocide, if “gender” was no more than “sex” under the ICC’s crimes 
against humanity, then similar factual circumstances might result in the ICC overlooking that the surviv-
ing women were victims of persecution as much as the dead men were, because a socio-cultural analysis is 
key to exposing this fact. 
100. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
101. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC is required to apply applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including those on treaty interpretation. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21. 
2005 / Gender and the International Criminal Court 73 
mentators on the plain meaning of the “two sexes, male and female,” the 
ICC is likely to also study “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law”102 in formulating its understanding of gender. These trea-
ties and laws include the principle of gender mainstreaming103 and the vari-
ous deªnitions of “gender,” including those outlined above, which are a part 
of international law. Many U.N. deªnitions take “sex” or biology as the starting 
point from which to contrast “gender,” and upon which the socially con-
structed understandings of “male” and “female” are built.104 
Within feminist theory, including feminist theory of international law, 
there are evolving and differing views on the nature of “sex” and “gender.” 
These differing views explain certain aspects of the criticism of the Rome 
Statute deªnition, especially of the phrase “two sexes, male and female.” 
Judith Butler argues that the “construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed 
as gender.”105 If this is so, then “sex” is not a place from which to contrast 
“gender” or a platform upon which the social construction of “gender” can 
be built. The U.N.-style approach outlined above does not take the social 
construction of “sex” into account. This, according to Cossman, means that 
the deªnition of “gender” at the international level loses its “subversive” 
possibilities and instead becomes narrowly conceived.106 Is it possible that 
the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender” encompasses Cossman’s approach, 
such that a reading of “sex” is also socially constructed? The possibility of 
interpreting the Statute with “sex” understood as a socially constructed con-
cept cannot be ruled out, given that the “two sexes” of the Rome Statute deªni-
tion are themselves potentially subject to “the context of society.” However, 
the deªnition seems to fall heavily on the side of the “sex”-as-a-starting-
point approach taken by the U.N., given a plain reading of the deªnition, 
the negotiation history, and the precedent provided by various U.N. deªnitions. 
 
                                                                                                                      
Following this approach, the ICC may examine the preparatory work of the Rome Statute and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion, if an interpretation “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose” still leaves 
the meaning “ambiguous or obscure.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, arts. 31, 32, Hein’s No. KAV 2424, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. It is highly likely that the ICC will 
need to consider the preparatory work in order to fully understand and interpret the deªnition of “gen-
der.” 
102. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b). 
103. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the 
United Nations, in this Volume. 
104. See 1995 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13; 1996 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 
69, ¶ 10; Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10; UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra 
note 70, art. I, ¶ 3; World Bank, supra note 73, at 24. 
105. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 7 (1990). 
106. See Cossman, supra note 2, at 284. By subversive possibilities, she means its ability to trouble and 
challenge the inevitability of the relationship between gender and sex, and the interpretations that ºow 
from a delinking of these constructs that might “disrupt and fragment the dominant cultural narrative.” 
See id. at 282–83. Charlesworth and Chinkin raise a related point: “If we attend to the constitutive role of 
the law and society in forming the ‘naturally’ sexed person, the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘biological differ-
ence’ can be seen to have constructed, contingent and political elements,” with the major difference 
between “sex” and “gender” being “their focus on different elements of dichotomies such as body/mind 
and nature/culture.” Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
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Cossman’s concerns are therefore validated. Even so, this fact is unlikely to 
have any practical effect on the ICC’s work as the word “sex” will always be 
considered by the Court in the context of the “gender” deªnition and not on 
its own, since it is not used elsewhere in the Statute. 
The second criticism of the deªnition raised by some authors is that the 
phrase “within the context of society” limits what the ICC can understand 
gender to mean, and therefore may limit the ICC’s consideration of the full 
range of factors affecting the social construction of gender. If this were true, 
then the ICC might not be able to examine certain factors related to how a 
society constructs “gender,” such as a strong cultural emphasis on marriage 
and female virginity at marriage, or societal viliªcation of gay men. If the 
ICC cannot examine these factors, then it will not be able to understand and 
evaluate adequately the effects of rape on a female victim who is deemed unmar-
riageable by her society, or on a man (whatever his sexual orientation) raped 
by another man in a homophobic society. Cossman argues that the phrase “in 
the context of society” is unclear and may be narrower than the typical view 
that “gender” involves socially constructed roles.107 The Special Rapporteur 
on Violence Against Women characterizes the deªnition as preventing ap-
proaches that rely on the social construction of gender.108 Not all commenta-
tors agree, however. Barbara Bedont, Katherine Hall Martinez, Rhonda 
Copelon, and Machteld Boot read the phrase “context of society” as incorpo-
rating a sociological or social construction of gender.109 The Special Rappor-
teur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery interpreted the deªnition to be “consis-
tent with other, more clearly stated formulations” adopted within the United 
Nations,110 which would include the socially and culturally sensitive deªnitions 
outlined above. 
There is no denying the fact that the phrase “within the context of soci-
ety” is not as clear as language found in, for example, U.N. deªnitions of 
“gender,” including “socially constructed,”111 “constructed by all societies,”112 
“socially deªned,”113 and “social differences.”114 Even so, the phrase “context 
of society” is not very different from the language found in the U.N. deªni-
tions. The phrase “within the context of society” was chosen to give ICC 
judges the ºexibility to determine the meaning of the phrase on a case-by-
case basis,115 which the U.N. deªnitions also encourage. In so doing, and in 
 
                                                                                                                      
107. Cossman, supra note 2, at 284. 
108. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, ¶ 19. 
109. Copelon, supra note 5, at 236–37; Bedont & Hall Martinez, supra note 11, at 3; Boot, supra note 
11, at 172. 
110. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, supra note 11, ¶ 26. 
111. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 10; Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10; 
OSAGI, supra note 74; UNDP, supra note 78, at 17; World Bank, supra note 73, at 24.  
112. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13. 
113. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 76. 
114. ILO and SEAPAT, supra note 79. 
115. Steains, supra note 34, at 374.  
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accordance with article 21, the ICC will need to create a set of signiªers of 
context such as those found in the U.N. deªnitions outlined above: roles 
(including the relationship between and among men’s and women’s roles), 
attitudes, values, attributes, expectations, status, opportunities, socialization 
processes, responsibilities assigned, rights, resources, and power, as deter-
mined and/or expected within a society or culture at any given time and 
place, and as affected by race, class, sexual orientation, poverty level, ethnic 
group, age, and other factors. The end result is that “context of society” nec-
essarily implicates the same factors as “socially constructed,” and therefore 
allows the ICC to consider a wide range of crucial factors involved in under-
standing “gender” within a society. 
In addition, while judges are to consider the “context of society,” this does 
not mean that they must defer to the context, a fear that seems to underlie some 
of the commentators’ concerns. When the ICC judges and Prosecutor are 
considering the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution, the 
ICC’s Elements of Crimes document requires that the deªnition of “gender” 
be evaluated in light of the acts and perception of the accused. The accused 
may try to rely on state- or society-supported misogynist or homophobic rea-
soning to excuse his actions. For example, an accused may try to excuse his 
crimes as being dictated by the kind of propaganda campaign that the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda described as taking place prior to 
and during the 1994 genocide, in which Tutsi women were presented as sexual 
objects.116 However, this defense would not be successful because the refer-
ence to “within the context of society” does not require the ICC’s Prosecutor 
and judges to situate themselves within, and potentially accept, a misogy-
nist or homophobic framework in order to determine whether “gender” was 
the basis for persecution.117 Similarly, if a society deªnes “gender” narrowly, 
this cannot negatively alter how the ICC provides victim and witness pro-
tection or participation, or how the Prosecutor undertakes his or her duties 
with respect to a certain situation. The Prosecutor, Registrar, and judges 
must not only examine the context of the society in which the crime took 
place (and how the perpetrator viewed that context), but must also interpret 
 
                                                                                                                      
Eventually, the language “within the context of society” was settled upon, with delegations on 
both sides of the issue satisªed that there was sufªcient ºexibility as well as precision inherent 
in the sentence. This effectively leaves the term open for the future Court to interpret and ap-
ply to the circumstances before it, as appropriate . . . . At the same time, the reference to 
“within the context of society” satisªed those delegations that wanted the deªnition to encap-
sulate the broader sociological aspects of the term, along the lines of earlier deªnitions. 
Id. 
116. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 732 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
117. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Addendum, Part II, Final-
ized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Court, art. 7(1)(h), U.N. 
Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). In fact, the reliance on such propaganda can serve as proof that the 
“perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or tar-
geted the group or collectivity as such,” id. at 15, and that the “perpetrator knew that the conduct was 
part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population,” id.  
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and apply the deªnition of “gender” in light of international law.118 The 
“society” considered in the Rome Statute’s deªnition is not only domestic, 
but also international.119 A helpful corollary is found in international refu-
gee law, which considers both the domestic and international social con-
struction of “gender.”120 
The third criticism leveled at the Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender” is 
that it appears to preclude the ICC from interpreting sexual orientation as 
included within “gender.” (This is actually a subset of the second concern; 
namely, that the ICC will not be able to consider one important aspect in 
the social construction of “gender”: the social understanding of sexual iden-
tity.) Charlesworth and Philips both take the view that the deªnition delib-
erately reºects the concern of Arab states and the Holy See that any reference 
to “gender” might be understood to include sexual orientation.121 While 
they do not explicitly conclude that sexual orientation is therefore excluded 
from the deªnition of “gender” (although Philips calls the approach “regres-
sive”122), Rana Lehr-Lehnardt does, stating that “gender means male and 
female, not homosexual” and that “homosexual provisions are excluded.”123 
Stephanie Farrior also assumes that “[d]ebates in Rome resulted in the 
[Rome Statute] adopting a limiting deªnition to ensure that persecution on 
the basis of sexual orientation would not be covered.”124 Cossman correctly 
notes that conservative states locked onto the concept of “gender” as poten-
tially subversive because it includes consideration of sexual identity.125 She 
concludes that, as a result of conservative pressure, the ICC’s deªnition ex-
cludes protections for “gender outlaws.”126 Like Charlesworth, Cossman fears 
that the ICC negotiators missed an opportunity to remap the margins or 
 
                                                                                                                      
118. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3). 
119. International refugee law provides some assistance in this regard. While refugee law is state-
based, it is not aimed at holding states responsible: its function is remedial. James Hathaway, New Direc-
tions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection, 8 J. Refugee Stud. 
288, 293 (1995). Refugee status is determined based on the story told by the claimant, and is often based 
on a fear created by an individual or and individual’s actions toward the claimant. When this is the case, 
refugee law accepts that the claimant may or may not deªne “gender” for him/herself in a particular way, 
but that the aggressor does deªne “gender”—and has acted upon that deªnition—in a manner that 
causes a well-founded fear of persecution in the claimant. Of course, the claimant may consciously choose 
to act outside of the constraints imposed by her culture’s deªnition of gender; in this case, “whatever 
cultural consensus exists, refugee law protects an individual who wishes to dissociate herself from that 
consensus, asserting that her choice is in line with international standards.” Deborah E. Anker, Refugee 
Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 133, 145 (2002). 
120. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 70, ¶ 3; see also supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
121. Charlesworth, Proceedings, supra note 42, at 207; Philips, supra note 8, at 233 n.14. 
122. Philips, supra note 8, at 233 n.14. 
123. Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 6, at 340, 351. 
124. Farrior, supra note 2, at 598. 
125. Cossman, supra note 2, at 284. 
126. Id. at 289; see also Brenda Cossman, The Gender of International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety-Third 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 93 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 206, 208 (1999). 
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boundaries of international law,127 rethink “gender,” and engage with both 
the limits and possibilities of agency, including sexual agency.128 
The views assuming that sexual orientation is excluded from the deªnition of 
“gender” are arguably incorrect. First, as Copelon notes, the “words do not 
support an exclusion of sexual orientation.”129 Indeed, as Cate Steains cor-
rectly recalls, there was no consensus as to whether the deªnition of “gen-
der” should include sexual orientation.130 This lack of consensus “effectively 
leaves the term open for the Court to interpret and apply to the circumstances 
before it, as appropriate.”131 Some seem to read the ªnal sentence of the Rome 
Statute deªnition as implicitly precluding “gender” from encompassing sex-
ual orientation.132 But the text does not say this and, as Bedont, Hall Marti-
nez, and Copelon have stated, many view this last sentence as tautological 
and superºuous133 because it simply refers the reader back to the ªrst sentence. 
This analysis is defensible under general principles of treaty interpretation, 
according to which the ICC would examine the ordinary meaning of the words 
of the second sentence,134 which say that the ªrst sentence does not have any 
meaning other than what it means.135 
 
                                                                                                                      
127. Cossman, supra note 2, at 291. 
128. Id. at 293–94. 
129. Copelon, supra note 5, at 237. 
130. E-mail from Cate Steains, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations in New York, 
to Valerie Oosterveld, Legal Ofªcer, Foreign Affairs Canada (Jan. 22, 2004) (on ªle with author). This 
would include no consensus on whether the ICC can consider the crime against humanity of persecution 
based on sexual orientation, whether the ICC is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation in the application and interpretation of law, whether the Prosecutor should, in hiring an 
adviser, consider whether that person has expertise in issues related to sexual orientation, and whether 
ICC ofªcials would need to consider sexual orientation when addressing the needs of victims and wit-
nesses. 
131. Steains, supra note 34. 
132. This misperception stems in part from an unfortunate editorial change to Steains’ chapter in The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations, 
Results. Id. Language was inserted by the editor without her permission that stated that the second 
sentence in the deªnition of “gender” was “ultimately included to forestall any implication that the issue 
of sexual orientation could be raised in connection with article 7(3).” E-mail from Cate Steains, supra note 
130. This sentence had originally read: “The second sentence was included upon the insistence of the 
‘anti-gender’ delegations, despite arguments by the ‘pro-gender’ delegations that it was superºuous.” Id. 
133. Bedont & Hall Martinez, supra note 11, at 203; Copelon, supra note 5, at 237. 
134. Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 188 (2000). 
135. While the ICC might stop at consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words, it might not 
consider that clear enough and would go on to consider the context, which would include the preambular 
reminder of the “unimaginable atrocities” that occurred over the past century and afªrmations that the 
ICC will address most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Id. at 188–91. See also 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶¶ 4, 9. The “unimaginable atrocities” would include the extermi-
nation of homosexuals during World War II. The ICC would also likely consider the preparatory work on 
the Rome Statute, in which those supportive of an inclusive deªnition of “gender” asked that the term 
“not imply any new meaning or connotation of the term different from accepted prior usage.” Author’s 
Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55. This was in response to a proposal by those 
opposed to the term “gender” that the deªnition state that “[t]he term does not imply the existence of 
more than two sexes.” Id. As a completely different text was adopted, the sentence does not imply either. 
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Second, Copelon convincingly argues that it is “dubious to argue that any 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of discrimination.”136 The right to 
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has been recognized by 
various United Nations treaty committees.137 Third, conceptions of “gender” 
and sexual orientation are inextricably linked. Violence against women or 
men based on cultural deªnitions of “appropriate maleness” or “femaleness” 
is intimately intertwined with violence against individuals based on sexual 
orientation.138 The concept of “gender,” especially in the context of gender-
based persecution, must be broad enough to capture any group challenging 
traditionally deªned gender roles—not only groups deªned by sexual orien-
tation, but also individuals who violate norms of gender conformity through 
their dress and other social, non-sexual forms of expression, such as trans-
gendered individuals.139 Women and those who attempt to transcend socie-
tal gender role expectations often ªght against similar opponents for similar 
underlying reasons.140 Under international refugee law, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees has recognized that gender-based persecution 
includes discrimination against homosexuals.141 
While there are strong arguments against an assumed exclusion of sexual 
orientation from the deªnition of “gender” in the Rome Statute, some might 
argue that it does not matter whether “gender” includes sexual orientation 
 
                                                                                                                      
136. Copelon, supra note 5, at 237. 
137. The Human Rights Committee, like several other U.N. Committees, has issued a number of 
concluding observations on the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Report of 
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because sexual orientation can be addressed through other avenues. For ex-
ample, sexual orientation could be included under “other status” in the arti-
cle on the application and interpretation of applicable law,142 as was done by 
certain states following the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action.143 Sexual orientation could possibly be considered in the crime 
against humanity of persecution, through the phrase “or any other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”144 
In addition, the Prosecutor could hire an adviser with expertise on sexual 
orientation issues, and the Court and the Prosecutor could consider the sex-
ual orientation of victims and witnesses in making decisions on investiga-
tions, prosecutions, and protection, because the considerations in the relevant 
articles are open-ended and not exhaustive.145 These arguments may provide 
alternative or additional ways of including sexual orientation in the Rome 
Statute, but the fact remains that a consideration of the construction of 
“gender” would not be complete without an evaluation of whether the col-
lective norms in a society understand “femaleness” and “maleness” only to 
include heterosexuality, or to include different sexual identities.146 In some 
cases the expectations of heterosexuality are so prevalent that they are fun-
damental to the interpretation of other aspects of “gender.” For example, perpe-
trators may choose to persecute groups of women using rape because they 
expect that the women will then be considered “deªled” and therefore un-
marriageable by the men in their society. 
Buried within the concern about potential exclusion of sexual orientation 
from the deªnition of “gender” is the separate concern that the ICC will 
conºate “sex,” “gender,” and “sexual orientation.”147 This could work in two 
ways: “gender” could be conºated with “sexual orientation” such that an analy-
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sis of “gender” begins and ends with an analysis of sexual orientation. This 
would limit the Court’s understanding of “gender” to only one facet of many 
that could be considered. This could lead the ICC to overlook cases of gen-
der-based persecution that do not (overtly) involve elements of sexual orien-
tation, such as targeting all male children for extermination because they 
could eventually become soldiers. This is not a likely scenario given the need 
for the ICC to evaluate the “context of society” and all of its attendant indi-
cators outlined above. The second way this triple conºation could work is 
that “sexual orientation” could be collapsed into either “sex” or “gender,” 
with the end result that the ICC equates “sexual orientation” with hetero-
sexuality.148 In other words, commentators are concerned that the ICC will 
fall into a trap of heteronormativity. While this concern stems from the ne-
gotiation history, in which conservative states pressed for the reference to 
“two sexes” in an unsuccessful attempt to collapse “gender” back into biol-
ogy, it also stems from feminist critiques arguing that “sex” is a socially con-
structed concept and questioning the link between the assumption that there 
are only two sexes and therefore two areas of evaluating “gender”—masculinity 
and femininity—and, implicitly, sexual identity.149 This triple conºation 
could cause problems if the ICC assumed in any given context that biologi-
cal sex and/or gender dictated a person’s sexuality, thereby overlooking po-
tential grounds for persecution. The ICC therefore must be alert to avoid 
conºating “sex” and/or “gender” with “sexual orientation,” even though there 
are no textual clues (as there are in the differentiation of “sex” and “gender”) 
within the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender.” 
Finally, some commentators fear that the fact that “gender” is deªned in 
the Rome Statute when other equally crucial terms are not suggests that gender 
issues will remain sidelined within international criminal justice. According 
to Jocelyn Campanaro, the very fact that “gender” is deªned and other key 
terms are not reºects a devaluation of gendered harms.150 She is concerned 
that gender-based crimes will not receive equal attention as a result,151 
probably because the deªnition is too narrow or because the ICC will be less 
inclined to prosecute or convict on the basis of an opaque deªnition. Simi-
larly, Brook Sari Moshan feels that the Rome Statute inappropriately qualiªes 
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the term “gender” and considers the deªnition a “failure.”152 She believes that 
the deªnition will complicate the prosecution of gender-based crimes as it is 
unworkable and impractical.153 She fears that the deªnition of “gender” im-
plies that gender-based persecution is different from other forms of persecu-
tion and therefore will be perceived by the ICC’s judges as “somehow less 
grave.”154 
Campanaro and Moshan’s concerns are understandable, given many fail-
ures in the past to prosecute fully, or prosecute at all, gender-based crimes.155 
However, much comfort can be found in the arguments above on the nature 
of the deªnition of “gender” and in the administrative structure of the ICC 
set out in the Statute. Under this structure, the Prosecutor must appoint 
advisers with legal expertise on sexual and gender violence156 and must take 
appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of 
crimes, taking into account whether the crimes involve gender violence.157 
These steps were speciªcally included to ensure that gender-based crimes are 
not sidelined or ignored.158 The Prosecutor has, in fact, highlighted gender-
based crimes in his statements relating to the investigation underway in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.159 
IV. Conclusion 
It is unfortunate that “gender” was singled out in the Rome Statute nego-
tiations and ultimately accorded a “peculiar and circular” deªnition.160 A 
large number of delegations wished to leave the term undeªned, just as the 
terms “political,” “racial,” “national,” “ethnic,” “cultural,” and “religious” 
were left undeªned in the crime against humanity of persecution, and as 
“age,” “race,” “colour,” “language,” “religion or belief,” “political or other 
opinion,” “national, ethnic, or social origin,” “wealth,” “birth,” and “other 
status” remain undeªned in article 21(3) on the application of the law with-
out adverse distinction. Once it became clear that the only solution was to 
adopt a deªnition, both sides in the “gender” debate would have preferred a 
deªnition that more clearly articulated their positions. As is often the case in 
international negotiations, states sought refuge in constructive ambiguity,161 
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leaving much of the decision-making on the content of the deªnition to the 
ICC’s judges (and, where provided for in the Statute, the Prosecutor and Regis-
trar). 
Since the interpretation of “gender” is left with the ICC itself, there are 
very real concerns by many commentators that the ICC will choose a narrow 
and regressive reading of the “gender” deªnition. This could have ramiªcations 
not only for how the ICC addresses certain crimes, applicable law and vic-
tims and witnesses, but also on the theorization of “gender” in international 
law more generally. While there is no guarantee that the ICC will go down 
such a negative path, there are many clear and positive guideposts pointing 
the ICC in a more progressive direction. If the ICC follows the more pro-
gressive path, many of the current concerns will appear overstated. A plain 
reading of the Rome Statute’s text and an interpretation based on U.N. 
deªnitions of “gender” support a differentiation between “sex” and “gender,” 
rather than a conºation of the two terms. The ICC will likely understand 
“context of society” as equal to “socially constructed” and draw its list of 
indicators of “context of society” from existing U.N. deªnitions of “gender” 
which are broad, multifaceted, and cross-cutting. While the ICC must con-
sider the “context of society,” it cannot defer to a misogynist or homophobic 
context. Additionally, the negotiation history and a plain reading of the 
Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender” demonstrate that “sexual orientation” 
is not explicitly excluded from “gender.” In addition, international law is 
increasingly recognizing “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination. Finally, the administrative structure provided for in the Rome 
Statute directs the Prosecutor to adopt a strong focus on gender-based 
crimes, resulting in a thorough review of such crimes by the ICC’s judges. 
Therefore, while one cannot predict with certainty that the ICC will avoid 
the pitfalls identiªed by Cossman, Charlesworth, the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women, and others, there are strong indicators that the 
ICC will take a path that beneªts gender justice at the ICC, and interna-
tional law more generally.162 
The criticisms of the Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender” highlight the 
fact that the term is undertheorized in international law. The fact that the 
Rome Statute leaves the ICC to give content to the term “gender” creates an 
important opportunity for international lawyers to focus more squarely on 
the meaning of the term. Increased theorization (at a general level and in the 
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context of the Rome Statute) can play a critical role in ensuring broad and 
productive interpretations of the term by the ICC. Increased theorization 
may mean transporting theories on the deªnition of “gender” from other con-
texts (the domestic legal context and others) and examining their applicabil-
ity to international law generally, as well as to speciªc areas of international 
law such as international human rights, humanitarian, criminal, and refugee 
law.163 It may also mean creating a new set of understandings, and would 
very likely include a great deal of ºuidity. A focus on theorizing “gender” 
will likely lead to a number of international legal approaches, just as there 
are a number of ever-evolving feminist approaches in other areas. 
The deªnition of “gender” in the Rome Statute should not automatically 
be replicated in other international law documents. This is easier said than 
done in the context of international consensus negotiations, in which an un-
equal power structure privileges those countries rejecting proposals (even when 
they are a small minority), and in which debates on “gender” are sometimes 
unfortunately characterized as “distractions” from the “main issues.”164 Add 
in the pressures of domestic, religious, and other politics and negotiators 
may view the Rome Statute deªnition as a “quick ªx” to resolve a crisis. This 
is what happened in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action of 
the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-
phobia and Related Intolerance.165 While the Rome Statute’s deªnition is 
broad and ºexible enough to ensure a positive and sensitive interpretation 
by the ICC’s Prosecutor, Registrar, and judges, its text is also spare and cir-
cular. Future documents can and should strive for a better-drafted and clearer 
approach, even if the text is essentially left similarly open to construction (this 
provides the opportunity for increased theorization of the term “gender”). To 
achieve this, states supportive of a sensitive and forward-looking use of the 
term “gender” must plan ahead, work together during negotiations, and act 
as a cohesive bloc. Again, this is easier prescribed than followed, as there 
would ªrst need to be consensus among a group of states as to some of the 
basic content of “gender,” even when there is no agreement within the femi-
nist community on the same point. However, such coordination is essential 
to ensure that states do not approach deªning “gender” progressively in an 
ad-hoc manner—as if opposition to the term always comes as a surprise—but 
rather approach such a deªnition as a strategic goal. 
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The Rome Statute deªnition does not transform international law from 
understanding “gender” in one way to understanding it a different way.166 In 
this sense, the deªnition in the Rome Statute represents a missed opportu-
nity to remap the boundaries of international law.167 Practically speaking, it 
probably was never possible to make a dramatic shift, given the dynamics of 
the negotiation. The result, however, is broad enough to allow the ICC to 
interpret the deªnition to reºect the approaches taken within the United 
Nations, including nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and 
avoid regression in the law. It is also enough of an empty vessel that increased 
attention to the theories of “gender” by international lawyers could also have 
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